





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




# Experimental use in France (1)

Recent case law from the Court of Appeal of Paris (Parienti v. Peugeot, July 3, 2002):

« If, with a view not to hinder technical progress, the legislator brought to patent monopoly the abovementioned exception, this exception is to be construed strictly and can apply only to experimental acts aiming to take part to the verification of the technical interest of the invention or to its improvement in order to expand knowledge, but not, as in the present case, to acts with a commercial purpose »




# Experimental use in France (3)

 « Dissenting » recent judgments of the Court of First Instance of Paris: producing a patented drug, or carrying out trials on it, is not infringement when it is in made in view of the granting of a marketing authorization, the latter not being an act of infringement (Science Union vs. AJC Pharma, Science Union vs. Biophelia)





- Smithkline & French v. Generics (E.C.J., 1997):
  - NL former statute: an application for a marketing authorization had to come together with samples
  - Generics provided samples with its application
  - SKF obtained that Generics' market entry be delayed for a period equivalent to the average duration of an authorization procedure
  - The ECJ held that such delay, although contrary to Article 30 of the Treaty, was justified by Article 36




# Experimental use in the U.S.A. (2)

C.A.F.C. decision: Madey v. Duke University (October 3, 2002 ):

• Our precedent does not immunize any conduct that is in keeping with the alleged infringer's legitimate business, regardless of commercial implications »

Duke, although an educational institution, infringed Madey's patents by using patented laser equipment for research: Duke's acts were « *in accordance with any reasonable interpretation of Duke's legitimate business objectives* »





 U.S.A.: after Roche v. Bolar, Hatch-Waxman Act created 35 U.S.C. 271 (e):

« (1) It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented invention ... solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products. »

• Other countries: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Hungary, Israel

Pierre Véron - 12/12/2002

# The Hatch-Waxman Act: the loopholes (1)


Hatch-Waxman Act created two provisions (along with the Bolar provision), in order to strike a balance between research-based industry and generics producers:

30-month automatic delay of generic drug entry upon filing of a patent on the original drug in the « Orange book » if the patentee sues the generic manufacturer for infringement

■180-day market exclusivity for the first generic producer to seek FDA approval



- 30-month automatic stay: abuses through patent misuse (frivolous patent filing)
- 180-day market exclusivity: abuses through agreements between brand-name companies and first generic maker (delay generic competition)
- Consequences:
  - numerous antitrust suits and class actions
  - Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act to modify the Hatch-Waxman Act




# WTO panel: Bolar *per se* consistent with TRIPS

WTO panel report in EC v. Canada (17/03/2000) allowed regulatory review exception (Bolar):

*« limited »* exception because confined to conduct needed to comply with requirements of regulatory approval process
does not conflict with *« normal exploitation of the*

patent »

patentees' interest to impose, upon generic producers' market entry, delay corresponding to delay suffered in obtaining government approval is not « *legitimate* »







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